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Abstract
In recent years, BitTorrent (BT) has become the most popular peer-to-peer file
sharing protocol. However, in spite of its popularity, the protocol has many
vulnerabilities that can be exploited by strategic peers. Some recent work
studied the trade-offs involved in BitTorrent algorithm, but the exploration
of the design space has not been comprehensive. In the dissertation, we
propose a new taxonomy-based approach for analyzing the trade-offs in a
practical implementation of the BT protocol and investigate these trade-offs
in the protocol design space. Finally, we propose two key design principles
we gleaned from our experience working with various BT clients: (i) keeping




BitTorrent (BT) [5] has in recent years become the predominant means for
peer-to-peer (P2P) content distribution on the Internet. A number of BT vari-
ants have also been proposed over the past few years to address various is-
sues like fairness [16] and strategic peers [13, 14]. Given its importance to file
sharing, it is important to understand how different elements in the protocol
will affect performance.
To the best of our knowledge, Fan et al. [6] were the first to propose a math-
ematical model that allows us to tradeoff performance for fairness in BT by
adjusting the ratio of regular unchokes to optimistic unchokes in BT protocol.
We found that in addition to this ratio, there are many other mechanisms that
can affect the trade-offs between performance and fairness that are not cap-
tured in their model. We believe that because the implementation of the BT
protocol is inherently complex, the trade-off between performance and fair-
ness cannot be adequately captured with a limited mathematical framework,
such as the one proposed by Fan et al.
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1.1 Our Approach
Therefore, we propose a new taxonomy-based approach for analyzing the
trade-offs that takes into consideration the practical implementation of the
BT protocol. To this end, we analyzed a number of the available BT variants,
including BitTyrant [14], BitThief [13], PropShare [11], FairTorrent [16] and
Azureus 3.0.4 [1], and compared them to the default BT protocol [5] to come
up with a taxonomy, based on the following four key decisions made by the
various protocols:
1. Number of connections , i.e. how many peers does each node connect
to?
2. Number of unchokes, i.e. how many peers does a node service simulta-
neously?
3. Peer selection strategy, i.e. how does a node decide which peer(s) to
unchoke?
4. Uplink bandwidth allocation, i.e. how much data is to be uploaded to
each unchoked peer?
The resulting taxonomy is shown in Figure 1.1.
We modified the Azureus BT client to comply with the behaviour of original
BT protocol to act as the baseline comparison and added additional code to
record key activities, like choke messages. We also augmented the client with
additional command-line arguments to allow us easily change various param-
eters and modified the client to support both seeding mode and non-seeding
mode, where nodes leave immediately upon completing a download. We did
the same for the other clients like BitTyrant [14], PropShare [11] and FairTor-




























Figure 1.1: Taxonomy of BT variants.
like unchoking algorithm that was based on deficit to allow us to compare the
performance of different algorithms for peer selection strategy.
We conducted experiments on PlanetLab using 100 nodes and 3 servers.
We chose a wide range of upload capacity for our nodes in order to mimic the
heterogeneous environment in real world. We looked into the possible options
for each decision by gathering from previous works and our own proposed
ideas. We collected logs from each node of each experiment and wrote scripts
to process them to give us data we like to analyze. We plotted various parame-
ters, like upload rate, client matching, utilization, etc. to help to visualize the
interval mechanics of each option and compare their differences in term of
fairness and performance. We investigated fairness and performance at both
the systematic and at the individual level. Though we realized that some of
the protocol decisions are related to one another, we try to separate them as
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much as possible so that we can analyze and study them individually to give
us some useful insight.
1.2 Contributions
By systematically studying the differences between the various BT variants
with our taxonomy-based approach, this dissertation makes the following
contributions:
1. Detailed Investigation of Protocol Design Space. Our detailed and
systematic exploration of the design space for the BT protocol reveals
more design knobs than those suggested by Fan et al. [6], including dif-
ferent peer selection strategies and data upload control. In particular, we
show that the peer selection can have significant impact on performance
and fairness.
2. Design Principles. From our experience working with the various BT
variants, we also articulate two key principles that we found are impor-
tant to achieve good performance:
• Keep promises, i.e. requests should be serviced promptly;
• Keep the neighbour information up-to-date.
1.3 Report Organization
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows: in Chapter 2, we pro-
vide an overview of the related work in the literature. In Chapter 3, we de-
scribe each level of taxonomy framework along with an associated measure-
ment study. In Chapter 4, we present the key principles along and investigate
4
how they can affect practical performance. Finally, we discuss future work




In this chapter, we first present a general overview of previous studies that
reveal some of its key vulnerabilities of the BitTorrent protocol. Next, we
describe several prominent strategic BT clients in chronological order. Finally,
we highlight some studies which focus on a high-level understanding of the
BT protocol design space.
2.1 Analysis, Simulation and Measurement Stud-
ies
There are a large number of analysis, simulation and measurement studies
on BT performance in the literature. Legout et al. [10] claimed that rarest
first and choke algorithm is enough to encourage reciprocation and prevent
free-ridiing and later showed experimentally that clustering and good sharing
incentive in BT systems [9]. The inherent weaknesses of the BT protocol has
also been extensively studied [17, 7, 2, 12].
Thommes et al. found that peer selection and unchoking techniques in de-
fault BT implementation can induce substantial unfairness and proposed the
use of a conditional optimistic unchoke to reduce the altruism introduced in
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unnecessarily optimistic unchoke [17]. They also suggested multiple connec-
tion chokes and variable number of unchokes to allow more flexibility on how
many peers to unchoke and who to unchoke in order to improve fairness.
Jun et al. modelled the incentives of BT as an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
problem and showed with PlanetLab experiments that free riders complete
downloads as early as those who contributes to the swarm [7]. To address
such unfairness, they proposed that a restriction be imposed on the differ-
ences of upload amount and download amount for each link to a certain
bound at all times.
Bharambe et al. found that BT’s rate-based Tit-For-Tat (TFT) policy can
give rise to unfairness across nodes in term of total data served in hetero-
geneous environment [2]. They proposed a pairwise block-level TFT which
reduces unfairness, which is essentially the equivalent to the scheme pro-
posed by Jun et al. [7]. The resulting trade-off is a reduction in utilization,
which is especially severe among faster peers. This is because the faster peers
are more likely to stop uploading to its neighbours whenever the block-level
TFT constraint is not satisfied.
Liogkas et al. studied the effect of selfish BT clients, which attempt to
download more than their fair share [12]. They identified three exploits, down-
loading only from seeds, downloading only from fastest peers and advertising
false pieces. Their experimental results showed that BT proved to be quite
robust against these exploits. However, the paper only studied each exploit
individually, therefore the effect of benefits may be greater if all exploits are
employed at the same time.
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2.2 Strategic BT Clients
Many different BT clients have been invented to exploit or fix the various
strategic vulnerabilities. BitThief [13] is a free-riding BT client that attempts
to download data without contributing to the swarm by uploading data at
all. BitThief tries to establish much more connections than the official client
which allows it to obtain data from more seeders and get more optimistic
unchokes from leechers. BitThief can achieve a high download rate, which
showed that the basic piece exchange mechanism is ineffective at restraining
free-riding peers.
Piatek et al. studied three different instances of altruism in BT-like pro-
tocols, namely the matching period, regular unchokes and optimistic un-
chokes [14]. To take advantage of the altruism, they propose a BT variant
called BitTyrant that uses greedy peer set size (i.e. number of connections)
which was proposed in BitThief [13] and greedy uplink allocation. Instead
of treating unchoked peers equally, by not limiting on how much data can
be uploaded to unchoked peers, BitTyrant attempts to upload only the min-
imum amount of data to each unchoked peer so as to secure and maintain
the peer’s reciprocation. In other words, the BitTyrant client seeks to max-
imize the total data download rate by actively managing the data uploaded
to each peer. Carra et al. subsequently showed that the performance gain of
BitTorrent over BT is due to the increased number of connections established
by BitTyrant peers, rather than to the alleged active upload management [3].
However, this study was limited to simulation. In our work, we verified that
the performance of BitTyrant is not as good as that claimed in the original
BitTyrant paper [14] through experiments on PlanetLab.
Laoutaris et al. developed an uplink allocation algorithm that can shorten
the download time by improving uplink utilization by dynamically managing
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the number of unchokes in real-time [8]. While keeping the upload capacity
of the peer is fully utilized, they try to minimize the number of unchokes
by uploading to the nodes with high upload capacity and low availability of
pieces. This minimizes the risk of under-utilization of neighbours. However,
since Laoutaris et al.’s protocol requires the peers to be cooperative, their
scheme may not be realistic in a real-world scenario.
PropShare was proposed to address the loopholes in original BT algorithm
which were exploited by BitThief and BitTyrant [11]. PropShare controls the
rate of data upload by assigning each peer with an upload limit equal to the
weighted average of the data received from the previous few rounds. Levin et
al. showed that PropShare is Sybil-proof and collusion-resistant. However, the
PropShare client needs to know its initially available upload capacity and only
thereafter can it allocate a preset upload quota for each connection. Further-
more, the upload quota of each connection may not be fully utilized, which
would result in wasted bandwidth. Nevertheless, PropShare outperforms Bit-
Tyrant when they are in the same swarm and BitTyrant cannot game Prop-
Share. This is because PropShare clients do not use any upload threshold to
decide who to unchoke, so there is no way for BitTyrant to determine what
minimum value to upload in order to win a bid for reciprocation.
FairTorrent [16] is an innovative algorithm similar to PropShare that tries
to address the problem of unfairness in original BT protocol without the need
of neighbours’ bandwidth estimation, risk of under-utilization and compli-
cated parameter tuning in previous attempts by other works. Basically it
does not choke any connections, but instead prioritizes uploads according to
difference of number of bytes uploaded and downloaded from any peer, which
is called deficit. The general idea is that the request from the peer which
has the least deficit will be served first. This approach can achieve fairness
naturally, however we will show in Section 4.1 that it can result in starvation.
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2.3 BT Protocol Design Space
Fan et al. proposed a mathematical framework to study the fairness and per-
formance of a P2P file sharing network [6]. They showed that there is a fun-
damental trade-off between performance and fairness. However, they only
investigated performance and fairness from a theoretical perspective, and the
actual algorithm for various BT-variants are not fully explored. For exam-
ple, the paper assumes that each peer divides its uploading capacity equally
among its neighbours. This is certainly not the case for BitTyrant, PropShare
and FairTorrent. The paper presents only one design knob to tune fairness
and performance based on original BT, which is by tuning number of regular
unchokes and optimistic unchokes. In a practical BT implementation, the de-
sign knobs are certainly more complicated that this. Furthermore, Fan et al.
did not seem to understand original purpose of optimistic unchokes. While
an optimistic unchoke is altruistic since it will give to others first, its purpose
is to explore the available peers to identify those that can reciprocate at a
faster rate than current set of peers that are unchoked by regular unchokes.
Optimistic unchokes are therefore not altruistic by design, but rather, the al-
truism is a side-effect. Therefore, the scenario where all the peers use only
optimistic unchokes only to serve other people is not realistic in an actual
real-world environment.
Xia et al. surveyed existing BT performance studies by adopting some gen-
eral approaches in categorizing existing works and summarizing the design
issues, their effectiveness and possible improvements [18]. Their survey in-
cludes works from analysis, measurement and simulation studies. However,
Xia et al. categorized all design issues under either piece exchange and over-
lay topology which is unnecessarily broad. There is no apparent relationship
between the two categories. In contrast, our work considers four factors that
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correspond directly to the BT protocol implementation, to systematically orga-
nize the design issues in a step-by-step manner, which we believe aids in our
understanding and appreciation of the mechanics involved in the BT protocol
and facilitates future design of new BT-related protocol. In addition, some of
the claims summarized by Xia et al.’s survey paper are mutually contradic-
tory and the authors made no attempt to verify the correctness of the claims.
Furthermore, there is no clear focus of the paper, so the issues covered are
much broader and the resulting discussions on each issue are inevitably very
brief. In our work, we focus mainly on performance and matching among
peers, which allows us to focus on fewer issues but in the process, investigate
each issue in greater depth.
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Chapter 3
Investigating the Protocol Design
Space
In this chapter, we first describe our framework for the proposed taxonomy of
protocols. We make the following assumptions in our discussion:
• The bandwidth bottleneck is in the uplink instead of the downlink at the
nodes. This assumption is consistent with previous work [6].
• Peers will attempt to fully utilize the upload capacity as long as they can
achieve good download rate.
Next, we investigate how the following parameters affect BT performance by
running experiments on the PlanetLab testbed [15]:
• Number of connections
• Number of Unchokes
• Peer Selection Strategy
• Uplink Bandwith Allocation
12
3.1 Overview of BT-like Protocols
In this section, we give a brief introduction to BT protocol and explain the
terms that are used in this dissertation.
A P2P file sharing network is formed by peers that want to download
and/or upload a common file. The file is divided into fixed size pieces (typi-
cally 256 KB each), and each piece is further divided into sub-pieces which
is called blocks, typically of 16 KB in size. The peers usually simultaneously
download and upload blocks of the file from one another. The peers that
have the complete file are called seeds and they effectively act as servers by
uploading pieces to other peers.
When a peer joins a BT-based file sharing network, it obtains a list of peers
from the tracker and connects to some of them. The peers exchange their
bitfield, a bit map that records what file pieces each peer has. Based on the
bitfield information, the peers can request missing pieces from other peers.
Choking is the mechanism used to limit the number of simultaneous upload.
By unchoking a remote peer, the local peer informs the the remote peer that it
can now request pieces from it and serves the requests accordingly. The set
of unchoked peers can be divided into regular unchoke peers and optimistic
unchoke peers. Nodes record how much data they download from each peer
every ten seconds, which we refer to as a time interval. Regular unchoke
peers are chosen from the remote peers that upload the most data blocks to
the local peer during the latest time interval according to the original protocol
specification. Optimistic unchoke peers usually chosen randomly by a node in
an attempt to find remote peers that can upload data to it at a faster rate than
its current set of unchoked peers. Seeds and the optimistic unchoke help to
bootstrap new peers without any file blocks to exchange with others.
There are basically two major strategies involved in the BT protocol, namely
13
peer selection strategy and piece selection strategy.
The peer selection strategy refers to how a node decides on which peers to
unchoke. In the BT protocol, the owner of the data decides which peers to
unchoke (upload) and will upload blocks according to the requests received
from the peers, while the unchoked peer only decides what piece to request.
The goal of peer selection is (i) to efficiently utilize available upload capacity
and (ii) to obtain maximum reciprocation from other peers. Hence, a node
needs to pick enough peers to fully utilize its upload capacity and also pick
wisely in order to maximize reciprocation from the peers.
The decision on which peer to download data from is usually passive. In the
original BT protocol, a peer can only request up to four pieces from neighbours
when they are unchoke, so the peer does not really have a choice about where
it wants to download data from. In fact, it need not. The more peers that
unchoke a peer, the better off is its situation. Just like in real-life, a person
needs not be concerned when there are many benevolent people around who
want to share their wealth.
Hence, once a node is unchoked, the remaining question is: what piece(s)
should it try to download. The de facto piece selection strategy in original BT
protocol is Local Rarest First (LRF). Since piece requests are usually pipelined,
two requests are often sent initially. More requests can be sent later if the
upload rate is found to be high.
3.2 Experimental Setup
To understand how various parameters affect the performance of the BT al-
gorithm, We conducted measurements on PlanetLab [4, 15] with BT, Azureus
and FairTorrent. We used Azureus version 3.0.4 as the BT client, but we mod-
ified the Azureus client to make it conform to original BT protocol as much
14
as possible. For FairTorrent, we used the implementation provided by Sher-
man et al. [16]. In all our experiments, the size of the file to be downloaded
is 100 MB, which is divided into blocks of 16 kB with 16 blocks forming a
piece. In each experiment, unless specified explicitly, we used 100 nodes to
simultaneously join the system and start downloading the file from the seed.
Peer bandwidth are set to be heterogeneous, we adopt a uniform distribution,
with the same number of peers having bandwidth 50KB/s, 75KB/s, 100KB/s,
125KB/s and 150 KB/s. This allows us to study the basic performance of BT
clients in a heterogeneous swarm which serves as a good starting point for
study of other more complicated distributions in future work. For most ex-
periments, we conduct two variants: a non-seeding round, where the peers
will leave after completion of download, and a seeding round, where the peers
will stay and become seeds after completion of download.
Choice of the Upload Bandwidth for Server: Before presenting the re-
sults from our experiments, we shall explain the methodology used to choose
an appropriate upload bandwidth for the server. In Figure 3.1, we plot the
time taken for the fastest client to complete its download and also the time
taken for the initial seed to give out every single block of the downloaded file.
It is clear that when the server bandwidth is less than 175KB/s, the time re-
quired by the server in issuing out all the fresh blocks imposes a lower bound
on the finish time of the fastest client. As the server bandwidth increases,
the finish time of the client is likely less affected by the server capacity but
more by the bandwidth distribution of peers in the system. We observed that
though unique pieces finish time constantly decreases as server upload band-
width increases, the best client finish time no longer improves with increasing
server capacity when server bandwidth exceeds 270KB/s. Given this obser-
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Figure 3.1: Plot of finish times against server upload bandwidth. Best client
finish time is the download completion time of the fastest client in the system.
Unique pieces finish time is the time needed by the server to issue out all
pieces of the downloaded file at least once to some peer in the system.
3.3 Number of Connections
Peer set size is defined as number of connections that a peer maintains in
the official BT protocol documentation. Maintaining connections with remote
peers serves two purposes. The first is to exchange useful information regard-
ing current pieces in possession with one another through bitfield and “have”
messages. This allows a peer to calculate the availability of each piece and
request local-rarest-first piece from other peers. The second is that from the
peer set, a node can try to find matching peers and unchoke them. If the
peer set size is too small, there may not be enough peers of compatible upload
bandwidth within the group and the peer may not be able to find matching
ones and will have to work with mismatched peers. Figure 3.2 shows that the
average download time is roughly constant when number of connections is
more than or equal to 30. We plot the upload utilization for different numbers


























Figure 3.2: Average download time of BT peers when varying the number of
connections.
size (as small as ten) can cause peers to become uninteresting to other peers
and consequently result in a drop in the upload utilization. Therefore, we
conclude that the local-rarest-first principle is effective in maintaining high
availability of the local peers to others, and allow BT to utilize upload capacity
efficiently.
In Figure 3.4, we plot the proportion of peer-bandwidth matching for all
the peers’ regular unchokes over time. If a node and its unchoked peer have
the same upload capacity, we consider them to be exactly matched. If the
absolute difference of node’s upload capacity and its unchoked peer differs by
no more than 25KB/s, we consider them to be roughly matched. We plot the
graph only for experiment running time up to 700 s because after this time,
some peers will complete their download and start leaving the system and this
adversely affects the matching among peers of similar bandwidths.
Figure 3.4a shows that for smallest peer set size (i.e. ten), the percentage
of exactly matched regular unchokes only increases slightly initially and stays


























Figure 3.3: Comparison of upload bandwidth utilization for different numbers
of connections.
there are limited neighbours for the local peers to explore for better match-
ing, so after a short while, the local peer would have found the best ones
in its peer set and continues to unchoke the same set of peers for the rest
of time. With more connections, the matching percentage generally increases
over time, since nodes have access to a large set of peers and nodes will gradu-
ally find better peers over time. Since the bandwidth used in our experiments
do not differ too much, it is expected some peers will be content to exchange
file blocks with peers of similar bandwidths. For example, a peer with 50KB/s
upload capacity may pair with another peer with 75KB/s and another peer
with 100KB/s upload capacity might pair with one with 75KB/s or 125KB/s
upload capacity. In Figure 3.4b, we see that the results for roughly matched















































Figure 3.4: The percentage of matched regular unchokes over time for differ-























Figure 3.5: The percentage of roughly matching regular unchokes for each
bandwidth groups over time for peer set size = 90.
Current BT protocol implementations usually use 50 connections as the
default. For our experiment setup, this setting is sufficient to include enough
peers of similar bandwidth in the peer set. However, due to the uncertainty
and heterogeniety in real-life swarms, we would not claim that is the one-
fit-all solution for all scenarios. We recommend that the download rate from
each regularly unchoked peers be measured periodically. If there is no im-
provement over the matching after some time, we might want to increase the
peer set size and allow more connections to be established. To investigate
the behaviourial difference of peers for different bandwidth groups, we plot
the matching ratios for the different groups in Figure 3.5, which shows the
matching ratio for a peer set size of 90.
Since we are comparing roughmatchly peers, those with bandwidth 75 KB/s,
100 KB/s, 125 KB/s can roughly match to peers of three bandwidth groups,
but for peer of bandwidth 50 KB/s and 150 KB/s, it can only match to two
bandwidth groups, so it is fair to compare peers of bandwidth 75 KB/s,
100 KB/s, 125 KB/s as one group, and peers of bandwidth 50 KB/s and
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150 KB/s as another group. From the both groups, we observe that, in gen-
eral, the peer matching ratio increases with higher bandwidth. Peers of band-
width 125 KB/s constantly match better than those of 100KB/s, and peers
of bandwidth 100 KB/s than those of 75 KB/s. It is also true for 150 KB/s
and 50 KB/s. This is due to the fact that the faster peers will gradually
match among themselves first, and slowly give up the slower peers it previ-
ously matched. When the slower peer realize that it has been abandoned by
the faster ones, will try to match itself with other slower ones, and then sta-
bilize. This process will go on until most the peers’ regularly unchoked ones
stabilize. So the faster peers will stabilize first, then the slower ones, and in
the end, the slowest ones.
While we might expect the the matching proportion for the different band-
width groups to eventually converge to a similar value, we found that this is
not true in practice, as shown in the Figure 3.5. The reason is that previously
we only focussed on the regular unchokes. When a fast peer has found its
matching peers and its regularly unchoked peers stabilize, it still uses opti-
mistic unchoke to explore better ones. Doing so is disastrous to slower peers
since they will very likely give up a currently better-matched peer in one of the
regular unchoke slots and replace it with a faster peer. However, when after
a while, the fast peer realizes that the slow peer cannot upload as much data
and will chokes the slow peer and in order to try another peer. So the slow
peer will be abandoned and it has to go and look for other peers to unchoke
and upload to. Similarly, the slower peers are constantly offered optimistic
unchokes by the fast peers, which may not seem like a bad thing, except that
they may disrupt the existing stable matchings of the slow peers.
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3.4 Number of Unchokes
The active set size is defined as the number of unchokes in official BT protocol
documentation. In the original BT algorithm, it is a fixed value: four regular
unchokes and one optimistic unchoke. In later versions, number of regular
unchokes is changed to a dynamic value that equals to ⌊√0.6 ∗ C⌋ where C is
the upload capacity and the number of optimistic unchokes is set to be two.
Later, in Azureus, a popular BT variant implemented using Java, it is still a
fixed number - three regular unchokes and one optimistic unchokes by de-
fault. We expect that a higher upload capacity will require more unchoked
peers in order to fully utilize the available capacity. In BitTyrant, it is a dy-
namic number based on the some calculation of the upload/download ratio
of the neighbours and the local peer’s own upload capacity. PropShare un-
chokes all the neighbors which has been uploaded some data to the local peer
during the last four rounds and also some peers who did not upload to the
local peer recently in order to know new peers.
Therefore, there are basically three classes of unchoke strategies: (i) a fixed
number, (ii) a dynamic number purely based on the local peer’s upload capac-
ity, and (iii) a dynamic number based on the remote peers who uploaded to
the local peer in the recent past (c.f. PropShare) or the ratio of the upload and
download rate of each remote peer (c.f. BitTyrant). Due to the complexity of
last category (since both PropShare and BitTyrant also involve data capping at
the same time), we only study the effect of first two categories in this section.
We ran multiple experiments by varying the fixed number of unchokes for
all nodes from 4 to 40 with step of 3 for both seeding and non-seeding cases.
We plot in Figure 3.6 the average download time of all nodes in each exper-
iment when number of unchokes changes. We found that, in general, when




























Figure 3.6: Average download time of BT peers when varying the fixed number
of unchokes from 4 to 40 with step of 3. Error bars indicate the standard
deviation. The client upload capacities are heterogeneous
because when there are too many unchokes, the pipe of each established TCP
connection would be rather thin, and that would reduce the efficiency of data
transmission for each connection. Furthermore, more unchokes would mean
that each unchoked peer would get slower download rate, and therefore take
a longer time to receive a complete piece from each peer. That may hurt the
availability of pieces to others. In order to find the best number of unchokes
for our distribution setup, we ran another set of experiments by varying the
fixed number of unchokes for all nodes from 1 to 10 with step of 1 for both
seeding and non-seeding cases. We plot the result in Figure 3.7. It shows that
the value is around 3 to 4 which is very close to the default unchokes (5) in
original BT protocol.
We also ran experiments with the original BT algorithm (denoted with
“BTold”) with a fixed number of unchokes (four in our case) along with the
latest version of the BT algorithm with number of unchokes varying accord-




























Figure 3.7: Average download time of BT peers when varying the fixed number
of unchokes from 1 to 10, with step of 1. Error bars indicate the standard
deviation.
uploaded and downloaded for each peer after 400 s in Figure 3.8. We pick
the time at 400 s because at that point, all the peers are busy exchanging
blocks with one another, yet none of them have completed the download. We
found that for BTold, the peers had equitable upload download ratio for all
bandwidth groups, while for BTnew, the faster peers (who uploaded more)
contribute more than they downloaded, and the slower peers received more
than they uploaded. Therefore, fixed number of unchokes for all peers actu-
ally achieves a better matching than a strategy where the number of unchokes













































(b) All BTnew clients
Figure 3.8: The matching graph of upload amount vs download amount for
all peers when time = 400s.
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As mentioned, BTnew sets number of regular unchokes to a dynamic value
that equals to ⌊√0.6 ∗ C⌋ where C is the upload capacity and the number of
optimistic unchokes is set to be two. We define equal-split to be the average
upload rate for a peer to each unchoked neighbours, which is the total upload
capacity divided by the number of unchokes. Table 3.1 shows a comparison of
number of unchokes and corresponding equal-split rates for BTold and BTnew
clients respectively for different upload capacities from 50KB/s to 150KB/s.
There are many more regular unchokes slots for fastest peers in BTnew (9)
than in BTold (4), so it takes much longer time to find 9 peers with matching
rate than in BTold case. Furthermore, since number of regular unchokes
increases with upload capacity for BTnew protocol, the difference of equal-
split rates for the faster peers and slower peers becomes smaller, so it becomes
even harder to match among the same bandwidth groups.
Table 3.1: Equal-split rate of BTold vs BTnew
Upload Capacity (KB/s) 50 75 100 125 150
BTold (# of unchokes) 5 5 5 5 5
BTold (equal-split rate) 10 15 20 25 30
BTnew (# of unchokes) 7 8 9 10 11
BTnew (equal-split rate) 7.14 9.38 11.11 12.5 13.64
3.4.1 Number of Optimistic Unchokes
The purpose of optimistic unchoke is allow nodes to find better peers with
which to exchange data. It is important to study how we should determine
the number of optimistic unchokes and how to pick peers to be unchoked
wisely.
We plot the average download time of BT peers when fixing the total un-
chokes to be 4 and 6, and varying the number of optimistic unchokes from






















Number of optimistic unchokes
6 total unchokes
4 total unchokes
Figure 3.9: Average download time of BT peers when varying the number of
optimistic unchokes for nonseeding case. Error bars indicate the standard
deviation.
non-seeding case, when the number of optimistic unchokes increases, the
average download time decreases. However, since the standard deviation be-
comes smaller, it suggests that the difference of average download time be-
tween faster nodes and slower nodes become smaller.
We plot in Figure 3.10 a comparison of total data downloaded and uploaded
for each peer when all nodes run default BT clients with 4 total unchokes at
time of 400 s. It shows that when the number of optimistic unchokes is two,
we achieve the best matching among peers. The matching for 4 optimistic un-
chokes is worse than that with no optimistic unchoke since the former treats
all peers equally, and the latter can at least choose the best ones among all
the peers it exchanges data with initially. Though the latter has a very small
set to choose from, it is still better than choosing randomly (four optimistic
unchokes). So the reduction in average download time achieved in Figure 3.9

































































(c) Four optimistic unchokes.
Figure 3.10: The matching graph of upload amount vs download amount for





















Number of optimistic unchokes
6 total unchokes
4 total unchokes
Figure 3.11: Average download time and fairness index of BT peers when
varying the number of optimistic unchokes.
We adopt the fairness index proposed by Fan et al. [6] to quantify the
fairness of our system and plot in Figure 3.11 the average download time
and fairness index when the number of total unchokes is fixed at 4 and 6
respecitively, and the optimistic unchokes is varied. It shows that as the
number of optimistic unchokes is increased, the fairness index increases until
a maximum value, and then it decreases. This agrees with the simulation
results of Fan et al. [6].
It shows the advantage and the drawback of the optimistic unchoke. The
main purpose of an optimistic unchoke is to allow a node to find better peers.
When it is zero, peers can choose from the peers they exchange data with ini-
tially (for a fixed number of unchoke N, they have information for N peers they
upload to and average N peers they download from, and in total they have less
or equal to 2N peers to choose from), so the fairness index is very low. When
number of optimistic unchokes initially increases, the optimistic unchokes
start allowing a node to better peers. Unfortunately, when it increases even
more, we start seeing the drawback of the optimistic unchoke, which is its al-
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truistic nature in uploading to others first. If number of optimistic unchokes
occupies more than a certain proportion of the total unchokes, a peer will end
up giving out too much upload capacity for nothing.
In addition, we also observe that when we have a larger number of total
unchokes, we will need more optimistic unchokes to achieve better fairness.
That is to be expected since with more unchokes, we need more time to find
the matching peers to fill the unchoke slots, and more optimistic unchoke may
help to achieve that faster. However, too many optimistic unchokes might
cause the peers to be excessively altrustic and affect fairness. Our results
suggest that as a good rule of thumb, the number of optimistic unchokes
should be slightly less than half of the total unchokes (one for four unchokes,
two for six unchokes).
Next, we plot in Figure 3.12 the average download time of BT peers when
the total unchokes is fixed at 4 and 6, and vary the number of optimistic
unchokes from 0 to the max number for seeding case. It shows when number
of optimistic unchokes increases more than half of the total unchokes, the
average download time starts to increase. The reason is that when there are
more optimistic unchokes, the peers tend to be more altruistic and the faster
peers will take longer to finish download and become seeds. Whenever a node
finishes and becomes a seed, there are less peers to share the total upload
capacity, so the average download rate received by each leecher will increase.
So it is generally better to allow faster nodes to finish earlier and become
seeds.
A simple example can help to better illustrate this concept. Assuming there
are 100 fast nodes of upload capacity of 80 KB/s, 100 slow nodes of upload
capacity of 20 KB/s and a server of upload capacity of 100 KB/s in the swarm.
To make our analysis simpler, we ignore the contribution of the server in our






















Number of optimistic unchokes
6 total unchokes
4 total unchokes
Figure 3.12: Average download time of BT peers when varying the number
of optimistic unchokes for seeding case. Error bars indicate the standard
deviation.
one will roughly get 50KB/s download rate. If we assume the file size to be
10000 KB, then it will take 200 s to download the file for each peer. How-
ever, if we allow fast nodes to exchange blocks among themselves through
perfect matching, the fast nodes will roughly take 125 s to download the file
and become seeds. Each slow peer would receive 20 × 125 = 2500 KB dur-
ing the period through data exchange among themselves and have 7500 KB
left to download for the file. The average download rate each slow peer now
receives is 100KB/s since one fast node (a seed) will upload to one slow node
on average, so in total it only takes 125 + 7500 / 100 = 200 s to down-
load the file for the slow nodes. So on average, the download time is only
(125 + 200)/2 = 162.5 s which is much smaller than 200 s in our previous
calculation. Therefore, it is beneficial to keep number of optimistic unchokes
small from a system point of view.
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3.5 Peer Selection Strategy
Peer selection strategy involves how to choose peers from the neighbours for
optimistic unchokes and regular unchokes respectively.
3.5.1 Choice of Peers for Optimistic Unchokes
The original BT protocol chooses randomly among all the neighbours. Azureus
implements a new strategy which gives higher priority to peers who have recip-
rocated in the past. It ranks all the peers based on deficits (data downloaded
to the local peer - data uploaded by the local peer) in a descending order with
the first peer being the one with the highest deficit. Then it generates a ran-





∗ peer_size. It uses the position value to pick the peer to unchoke from
the ordered list. We plot the function in Figure 3.13, and it shows that the
strategy favors the peers who are nearer to the end of the peer list (nearer to
1), and thus have lower deficits.
We plot in Figure 3.14 the percentage of exactly and roughly matched reg-
ular unchokes over time for the two peer selection strategies: (i) random opti-
mistic unchokes and (ii) factor of reciprocation consideration. We found that
when we consider factor of reciprocation in choosing peer for optimistic un-
choke, the percent of matched regular unchokes is slightly higher for the du-
ration of the download process. We also plot in Figure 3.15 the percentage of
exactly matched optimistic unchokes over time for the two different strategies

















Figure 3.13: The function that Azureus uses to calculate and locate the peer(s)






















Figure 3.14: The percentage of exactly and roughly matched regular unchokes























Figure 3.15: The percentage of exactly matched optimistic unchokes over time
for random optimistic unchokes and factor of reciprocation consideration for
peers with upload capacity of 100 KB/s and 150 KB/s.
We found that the high (150 KB/s) and middle (100 KB/s) upload capacity
peers are more likely to pick peers from their own bandwidth groups if we use
the factor of reciprocation peer selection strategy. Doing so is helpful because
low bandwidth peers who would less likely be mistakenly unchoked by the
higher bandwidth peers, and thus are more likely to stay matched with peers
in its own group. We plot in Figure 3.16 the percentage of exactly matched
regular unchokes over time for random optimistic unchokes and factor of
reciprocation consideration for peers with upload capacity of 50 KB/s and
found that slow peers (50 KB/s) are more likely to pick peers from its own
groups for regular unchokes.
However, it does not tell the whole story. We plot the percentage of exactly
matched optimistic unchokes over time for random optimistic unchokes and
factor of reciprocation consideration for peers with upload capacity of 50 KB/s
in Figure 3.17. It shows that this strategy does not prevent the slow peers from




















Figure 3.16: The percentage of exactly matched regular unchokes over time
for random optimistic unchokes and factor of reciprocation consideration for
peers with upload capacity of 50KB/s.
the strategy used, since a peer is more likely to choose peers who have lower
deficit, a slow peer is more likely to choose faster ones who optimistically
unchoke it and upload to it recently.
3.5.2 Choice of Peers for Regular Unchokes
In the original BT algorithm, peers for regular unchokes are chosen from the
remote peers who can upload the most data to the local peer in the past period.
BitTyrant changes it to download/upload ratio to maximize the return it can
get from its upload. Some papers [2, 16] suggest using deficit (difference
between download and upload amount) to find the peers the local peer owes
the most and serve them. In our experiment, we compare selection based on
download rate received and deficit. We ran experiments of all nodes running
BT clients that use download rate and deficit respectively and calculated the
average download time and fairness index for both seeding and non-seeding




















Figure 3.17: The percentage of exactly matched optimistic unchokes over time
for random optimistic unchokes and factor of reciprocation consideration for
peers with upload capacity of 50 KB/s.




Download rate (Nonseeding) 1067.8 0.948
Deficit (Nonseeding) 1088.9 0.973
Download rate (Seeding) 936.7 0.938
Deficit (Seeding) 917.9 0.976
both strategies does not differ much, however, the peer selection based on
deficit achieves higher fairness index. This is to be expectated because the
deficit-based strategy strives to unchoke the peers with the least deficit (which
the local peer owes the most), it aims to achieve better fairness. We plot in
Figure 3.18 the comparison of the data downloaded and uploaded for all peers
when time = 400 s. It shows that unchoking based on deficit achieves much













































(b) Use of deficit for unchoking
Figure 3.18: The matching graph of upload amount vs download amount for
























Figure 3.19: Comparison of upload bandwidth utilization among peers run-
ning BT, BitTyrant and PropShare.
3.6 Uplink Bandwidth Allocation
In the original BT protocol, no limit is imposed on data uploaded to each
unchoked neighbour within each round. In fact, it is this vulnerability which
BitTyrant [14] attempted to exploit. In BitTyrant, the upload contribution to
each peer is adjusted to find the minimum upload contribution required for
reciprocation. PropShare [11] proposes to limit the upload data of a client to
different peers in order to ensure that the amount of data uploaded to each
peer is proportional to the data received from it.
We ran experiments for peers running BT, BitTyrant and PropShare re-
spectively in each round and plot the resulting distribution of the bandwidth
utilization at a time after all peers have sufficient blocks to start exchanging
pieces and before the first peer completely downs the file in Figure 3.19 and
average utilization as compared with BT in Table 3.3. It is clear that limiting
uplink allocation reduces efficiency of the utilization of the available upload
bandwidth severely.
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Table 3.3: Utilization of BitTyrant and PropShare




In summary, the following are our key findings:
• The number of connections does not affect the performance beyond a
certain threshold (around 30).
• The number of unchokes should be kept low, preferably around four.
Adjusting the number based on upload capacity would weaken matching.
• The number of optimistic unchokes should be kept slightly less than
half of the total unchokes. More optimistic unchokes would be more
altruistic, thus reducing fairness; less unchokes may cause peers to take
longer time to match with peers of similar bandwidth.
• For selection of peers for optimistic unchokes, it is useful to consider fac-
tor of reciprocation for relatively faster nodes. Slow nodes may indirectly
benefit from it but do not need to adopt it themselves.
• For selection of peers for regular unchokes, using deficit may improve
fairness with little impact on performance when compared with tradi-
tional method of using download rate.
• It is generally detrimental to limit upload bandwidth for each connection
since that may reduce utilization since allocated bandwidths may not be




In a society, there are rules and regulations in place to ensure that all res-
idents to live harmoniously together. In a P2P swarm, we also have similar
principles that should be followed if all peers want to benefit mutually from
the swarm. While studying the taxonomy along with various existing proto-
cols, we came up with two key principles which are important for BT protocol
design.
4.1 Keep Promise
In the default BT algorithm [5], Azureus [1], BitThief [13], BitTyrant [14] and
PropShare [11], piece requests are serviced in a FIFO manner. When a re-
quest is received, it is expected to be served within a reasonable period of
time. FairTorrent differs by ordering the requests according to the deficit (dif-
ference between upload amount and download amount) of the sender of the
requests, and serving the requests from the peers with the lowest deficit first.
This priority uploading scheme introduces uncertainty in the request serving
process. Some requests will get delayed for a long time, leaving the sender
of the requests with no idea of whether the requests will be serviced, and if
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so, when. Eventually the uploading peer may get snubbed by the request-
ing peer after 60 s, and the request may get time-out and cancelled by the
requesting peer after 120 s if the requesting peer follows the default BT proto-
col specification. This priority scheduling of serving requests can often cause
starvation, especially for slow peers who tend to have higher deficit from other
faster peers’ perspective.
We ran experiments of all nodes running FairTorrent [16] and Azureus [1]
clients respectively with the same upload capacity of 128 KB/s and plot the
number of CANCEL messages received for each 10 s interval for the duration
of the experiments and the corresponding average upload rate of all peers
in Figure 4.1. We found that all the FairTorrent peers experienced many
CANCEL message as compared to that of all Azureus peers. The performance
inevitably degrades when there are too many CANCEL messages as shown by
a dip in average upload rate in the graph.
We assigned an ID in an increasing order of service time for the requests
of FairTorrent and Azureus clients and plot the request service time for each
request ID in Figure 4.2. We found that a large number of requests of Fair-
Torrent clents experience a service time that is significantly larger than that
of Azureus, which can cause uncertainty for requesting peers. From the
summary of results in Table 4.1, we find that the average download time
for Azureus is lower than that for FairTorrent. Therefore, it is important to
keep promise by serving requests promptly.
Table 4.1: Comparison of experiment results for Azureus and FairTorrent

















































Figure 4.1: Number of CANCEL messages received for each 10 secs interval























Figure 4.2: Time taken to serve each request. Requests are ordered according
to service time.
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4.2 Keep Neighbour Information Up-to-date
PropShare [11] clients withhold HAVE messages to prolong other peers’ in-
terest in the client. Azureus [1] clients also implement HAVE message ag-
gregation, which accumulates and combines many HAVE messages into one
message in order to save on bandwidth. We ran experiments of all Azureus
nodes with HAVE message aggregation turn on and off and presented the re-
sult in Table 4.2. It shows that although average download time does not
differ much, it takes a shorter time for the servers to send out all fresh pieces
into the system when HAVE message aggregation is turned off. This is to
be expected because when clients have more up-to-date piece information of
their neighbours, they are less likely to request the pieces that their neigh-
bours already have from the servers, so they are more likely to request fresh
pieces which have not been sent out to any peer from the servers. This, if we
have servers that are not well provisioned, it is important to keep neighbour
information up-to-date in order to reduce the burden on the server side.
Table 4.2: Comparison of experiment results with HAVE aggregation turn on
and off
Average download Time taken for servers to






In the dissertation, we propose a new taxonomy-based approach for analyzing
the trade-offs that should be considered in the practical implementation of the
BT protocol. We conducted a detailed investigation of protocol design space
through PlanetLab experiments. Through the study, we come to realize that
good matching is not easily achieved and maintained, careful analysis and
implementation is required to achieve effective, efficient and stable matching
on both the individual level and the system level.
Next, we articulate two key design principles that we gleaned from our ex-
perience working with various BT clients, namely keeping promise and keep-
ing neighbours information up-to-date. BT-like P2P protocols are complicated
systems since it involves interplay of various clients of different behaviour.
However, we believe our work is helpful in guiding future BT protocol design-
ers in implementing their clients to achieve good performance and matching
while fostering a healthy P2P file sharing environment.
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5.1 Future Work
For regular unchokes, we can look into whether it is better to vary the number
over time or keep it fixed when upload capacity is known. We generally feel
that from a system point of view, a fixed value would improve stability. But
from an individual point of view, varying the number may help it to achieve
better matching. As for the choice of peers, the original protocol favors peers of
highest upload rate, but that may not be stable when peers have very different
equal-split rates. A improved version may be to pick neighbours of similar
equal-split rates.
For optimistic unchokes, we can study whether we should fix the number
or allow it to vary depending on the circumstances. The original BT protocol
fixes it to be one or two, but an improvement may be to use more optimistic
unchokes at start-up phase, and reduce it when more matching is achieved.
When reasonable matching is achieved for all regular unchokes, then opti-
mistic unchoke could reduce to zero or switch to regular unchoke.
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